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ABSTRACT:

How INTERNATIONAL IS 'INTERNATIONAL' LAW?
The international legal community posits universality as a central
characteristic of modern international law. But there has been little work
to assess the degree to which international legal norms are widely
shared and incorporated into the foreign policy-making of states. Previous work in this area has attempted to describe the distribution of legal
values across cultures. This work has proven contradictory and inconclusive. The epistemic communities literature suggests looking at the
distribution of practitioners as an alternative approach for assessing the
diffusion of norms and practices. In fact, the community of litigators
who practice before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) comes from
a very small set of Western states. While Western states utilize their
own staff lawyers when appearing before the ICJ, non-Western states
hire Western lawyers. International lawyers often identify the ICJ as the
premier institution of public international law. The failure of nonWestern states to produce their own lawyers for use at the ICJ raises
significant questions about their resources and motivation to incorporate
international law into their foreign policy-making. By these measures,
international law is not as 'international' as its name implies.
I. ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF LAW

American and international attention was focused on the growing
importance of international law by a recent case before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) involving the Republic of Paraguay and the
United States. In that case Paraguay sought relief for the Paraguayan
citizen, Angel Francisco Breard, who faced the death penalty in the
United States for a murder committed in Virginia in 1992. Facing off
for the oral pleadings on April 7, 1998 at the Peace Palace in The Hague
were nine Americans and two Paraguayans. The oral pleadings took a
total of about three and a half hours. During that time roughly 23,500
words were spoken. Of these, 22,800 came from the mouths of the
Americans, while the laconic Paraguayans uttered just 700. The two
sides were not as lopsided as this might imply since three of the Americans were arguing on Paraguay's behalf.'
1. Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United
States of America) (oral pleadings, uncorrected verbatim transcripts), http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (last visited February 27, 2001). The presentation of the Paraguayan case took up some 9,800 words to 13,700 words for the American
case.
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The case of Paraguayv. United States reflects a larger phenomenon
in the practice of international law. The most visible practitioners of
international law are predominantly from the United States and a handful of Western European countries. Despite this obvious imbalance,
international legal scholars frequently assert that international law is
"truly universal." 2 In this article we document the extent of the Western
monopoly of international legal practice at the ICJ and argue that this
domination suggests that "international" law is not as international as
its name implies. This argument is important not just for its implications
concerning international law, but also for our broader theoretical understanding of the sources, spread, and survival of norms and ideas in
international relations.
The Western domination of international legal practice will not
come as a surprise to anyone who has studied ICJ proceedings. We provide here the first systematic description of who practices law at the ICJ
and advance an argument about its significance. Some will dismiss the
phenomenon we observe as simply a manifestation of legal specialization within a region that has a longer legal tradition. We will argue that
this is not an adequate explanation for the degree of imbalance we observe, and that if international law were truly an integral part of foreign
policy-making in most countries there would be many more appearances of non-Western lawyers before the Court. But this is getting ahead
of our argument. We begin by looking at the universality claims made
by the international law community. We then set out a sociological approach to the study of legal norms that serves as the foundation for our
argument. Within this context, we present the systematic evidence of the
extreme Western bias in the distribution of international legal practice.
Finally, we return to a broader assessment of the implications of our
findings for the character and content of contemporary international
law.
A. The Universality of InternationalLaw
The question of whether international law is really "law" has been
frequently discussed.3 Our essential question is about the international
rather than the legal character of international law. Are internatibnal
legal norms and ideas genuinely shared throughout the system, or are
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
12-13 (6th ed. 1987); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT
WORKS 256 (1995); REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDENT INTRODUCTION 5 (1986)

3. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really 'Law'?, 79 Nw. U. L.
1293 (1985).

REV.
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they a set of regulations that are primarily the province of a small group
of powerful states?
All legal systems assert universality within their given domain.4
Since international law takes as its domain the set of states in the international system, it is only natural that international legal scholars would
assert the global relevance of international legal principles. Nonetheless,
there have been some significant changes in the universalist conceptions
of international law over the past five centuries.
The philosophical roots of modern international law in the natural
law tradition provided an initial basis for the assertion of universality
Whether from a more humanistic standpoint, such as in the work of
Bodin and Gentili, or from the theological view of Grotius or the Spanish scholastics, Vitoria and Suarez, natural law was viewed as
potentially the same for all people in all places. The shift from natural to
positive international law in the late 18th century coincided with a
growing recognition that international law was not really international at
all. Instead, as Murray Forsyth notes, "there was a specific system of
'European public law,' which had spread to a few other parts of the
globe (the United States being the most obvious example), but elsewhere forms of international behavior bore only a limited resemblance
to it."6 International law publications during this period reflected this
changing conception in their titles. During the late 18th and early 19th
centuries, the titles of major international legal publications "referred
expressly to the 'European' law of nations."7
Around the middle of the 19th century, universal aspirations again
came to the fore. Legal scholars and activists became increasingly willing to assert the global relevance of a set of rules for international
interactions. Correspondingly, the use of the term "European law of nations" was increasingly replaced by the term preferred by English and
8
American authors: "international law.",

4.

See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the JuridicalField,
L.J. 805, 844-48 (1987) (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
5: See Murray Forsyth, The Tradition of InternationalLaw, in TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 23 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992).
6. Id. at 36.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 37. In his discussion of the role of the 19th century American peace movement
in the development of international law, Janis provides another example of the Anglo38

HASTINGS

American penchant for universalistic language. In 1843, the First Universal Peace Conference in London was attended by 292 delegates from the UK, 26 from the US, and just 6 from
continental Europe. Mark W. Janis, Protestants, Progress and Peace: Enthusiasm for an
Inernational Court in Early Nineteenth-Century America, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223, 235 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
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In the twentieth century international lawyers continued to express
confidence in the genuine universality of international law. In 1921
James Brown Scott, the founding editor of the American Journal of InternationalLaw, opined in the pages of that journal that the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ)-the precursor to the ICJ-had
realized "one dream of the ages" in its integration of different civilizations and systems of law. 9 Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, one of the
original judges on the Permanent Court of International Justice, echoed
this spirit of optimism about the universality of international legal procedures in his 1925 assertion that: "[a]ll the races, all the continents, all
the forms of civilization are before the Court. Swiftly, and finally, the
conception and practice of law and justice in international relations has
conquered the world."'
In the rebuilding of the international system that followed World
War II, the PCIJ was replaced by the ICJ. Just as the PCIJ proved less
permanent than its name implied, so too post-war scholars and practitioners came to see the PCIJ as less universal than had originally been
thought. With the dramatic expansion of the international system in the
process of decolonization, new standards for the meaning of the universality of international law were raised. C. Wilfred Jenks expressed the
essence of this new view:
[International law] can no longer be a projection of a group of
closely related legal systems based on the civil and common
law traditions, but must rest on the broader intellectual foundations necessary to give it world-wide authority in an age which
is no longer prepared to accept the leadership of any one nation,
culture, ideology or legal system."
Alongside of these new standards, however, came the same assertions that universality had at last been genuinely attained. Rebecca
Wallace writes in her introductory international law textbook
"[i]nternational law is no longer ...an exclusive western club.... The
European bias of international law has been destroyed. ' " Mohamad
Shahabuddeen, a former ICJ judge, describes the PCIJ as having been
directed towards a European audience, 3 and endorses the universal
character of the ICJ:

9. James Brown Scott, The Election of Judges for the Permanent Court of International Justice, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 556, 558 (1921).
10. ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT 219 (1925).
11. ARTHUR LARSON & C. WILFRED JENKS, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 3 (1965).
12. WALLACE, supra note 2, at 5.
13. MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 207 (1996).
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The Court was designed to be a World Court; it is now more
truly so than ever. The disciplined play within it of the different
legal cultures which compose it is essential to its capacity to
speak with the authority of the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations.4
Even some analysts who have emphasized the weak diffusion of
some parts of the international system have similarly endorsed the universal character of public international law as practiced before the ICJ.
Samuel Asante, for example, in a study of the practitioners of international arbitration, argues that international commercial arbitration norms
have not effectively spread to African countries, but nonetheless accepts
that "the term 'World Court' which is used interchangeably with the
ICJ, is appropriate and well-merited."' 5
But, as this brief review has shown, international legal scholars have
long made universalist claims. How are we to assess whether the current
claims have more validity than the now discredited assertions of the
past? Previous arguments about the international character of international law have tended to focus on the degree to which legal norms are
shared across different cultures. Jenks argues that there is already a
"common law of mankind."' 6 Surveying world legal systems, he concluded that there is a robust base for international law across cultures. A
similar argument is advanced by R.P. Anand in a survey of legal attitudes in developing countries.' 7 Adda Bozeman, on the other hand,
reviews traditional Asian and African values and concludes that the lack
of legal norms is fundamental to these cultures and will limit their ability to be integrated into Western-style international relations.' 8 James
Nafziger, conducting a similar review of the relationship between international law and distinctive religious beliefs, finds several important
areas where international law and cultural practices diverge, "For example, prohibitions on whaling by national and international agencies ...
may conflict with indigenous religious practices. Prescriptions to protect
the rights of women ...have been rejected by some Islamic tradi-

14. Id. at 208.
15. Samuel K.B. Asante, The Perspective of African Countries on International CommercialArbitration,6 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 331, 348 (1993).
16. LARSON & JENKS, supra note 11.
17. R.P. ANAND, CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1986).

18.

(1971).

ADDA B. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD

163-72
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tions."' 9 More generally, while international law scholars focus on the
commonalities, comparative law scholars tend to emphasize the diversity of legal cultures. 0 David and Brierley, for example, argue that "The
Muslim world, India, the Far East and Africa are far from having adhered to [Western civilization] without reservation. These countries
remain largely faithful to philosophies in which the place2 and function
West.", '
of law are very different from what they are in the
The cultural analysis of the international legal environment has been
a valuable contribution to our understanding of the nature of international law, but in addition to being inconclusive and contradictory, these
studies have not addressed the actual incorporation of international legal
norms into the preferences and practices of states.
B. The Sociological Approach to Legal Studies

Norms are a notoriously difficult area for empirical research. One
prominent literature in international relations theory has attempted to
gain empirical leverage on norms by looking at "epistemic communities." This literature emphasizes the role of groups of experts and
practitioners in the diffusion of norms. An epistemic community has
been defined as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area." 2 These
professionals share belief systems and "a common policy enterprise,"
which they engage in "out of the conviction that human welfare will be
enhanced as a consequence.'23 Epistemic communities do not merely
inform state action, but educate states by causing them to reevaluate
their interests.
Law is at its core a socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, the sociological analysis of communities of practitioners is a relatively
common approach in the analysis of legal systems. 4 Although it has not
19. James A. R. Nafziger, The Functions of Religion in the InternationalLegal System,
in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 147, 151
(Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
20. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativismand International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997).
21. RENt DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD ToDAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 26 (Stevens & Sons 1978)
(1964).
22. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
23. Id.
24. This strategy has been used in looking at private international law in the work of
Asante, supra note 15; YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION

AND

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A

TRANSNATIONAL
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been previously applied to public international law, the epistemic communities approach is particularly appropriate for the analysis of
international legal norms. Practitioners play a critical role in the formation and articulation of international law. Former ICJ judge Sir Robert
Jennings asserts that practicing international lawyers "have much more
say in the shaping of international law... than do their counterparts in
domestic law making. '2 There is no hierarchical legislative or legal
system to formulate international legal principles. Instead, international
law depends critically on the practice of states and on the interpretation
of myriad formal and informal agreements between individual states.
States learn what international law is from the lawyers who practice it.
As we will argue at more length below, who practices international
law at the ICJ matters for at least two reasons. First, legal practitioners
compete to articulate particular visions of the law.26 Antonio Cassese
identifies different "segments of the world community" that not only
"have a different concept of international law and attribute a different
role to it, but they also endeavor to give it a shape according to their
own interests. 27 Cassese particularly singles out the concept of law in
the developing world, which he asserts is "profoundly distinct from that
predominating in the West., 28 Other scholars have emphasized the distinctive legal cultures of Asian and African states and the difficulties of
their integration into international law and legal practices. 29 Anne-Marie
Slaughter makes a more general argument about the different perspectives of liberal and illiberal states in their attitudes toward public
international law.30
(1996)). Trubek and his co-authors point to the role of lawyers both in the
process of globalization and in the competition between different legal systems. David M.
LEGAL ORDER

Trubek et al, Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalizationof Legal
Fields and the Creation of TransnationalArenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994). For
a variety of other examples of this analytic approach, see KEVIN McGuIRE, THE SUPREME
COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY (1993), ERWIN SMIGEL, THE
WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN?
BARRISTERS' CLERKS: THE LAW'S MIDDLEMEN

(1964),

and JOHN FLOOD,

(1983).

25. Robert Jennings, International Lawyers and the Progressive Development of International Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 413, 414 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
26. Bourdieu, supra note 4; Dezalay & Garth, supra note 24; and Trubek, et al., supra
note 24.
27. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 393 (1986).
28. Id. at 117.
29. See, e.g., DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 21 at 28-29, 477-504; Asante, supra note
15; Whitmore Gray, The Challenge of Asian Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. I (1995); Gabriele
Crespi-Reghizzi, Legal Aspects of Trade with China: The Italian Experience 9 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 85 (1968).
30. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A DualAgenda 87 AM. J.INT'L L. 205 (1993).
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We argue here that looking at the diffusion of practitioners also
matters because it sheds light on the diffusion of ideas and norms in international law in particular and international relations more generally;
the bias in who practices international law reveals an underlying limitation in the internalization of international legal norms among a large
number of states in the international system. As is argued in the epistemic communities literature, internalized norms should be carried by a
community of practitioners. The relative lack of non-Western legal
practitioners at the ICJ indicates a more systematic lack of international
legal expertise within non-Western foreign policy institutions. This in
turn suggests an important limitation on the potential for international
law to effectively constrain the behavior of states.
Before turning to these arguments in more depth, it is useful to
briefly consider the nature of legal procedures at the World Court, and
then to set out the fundamental data that serves as the foundation for our
argument.
C. Legal Proceduresat the ICJ
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It
takes only a cursory review of any international law text to see that the
ICJ has played a central role in defining and interpreting international
legal norms. During its first half-century of operation-1948 to 1998the Court dealt with some 47 contentious cases, delivered 61 judgments
and offered 23 advisory opinions.3 ' While the court has no direct enforcement capabilities, the record of state compliance with its decisions
has been generally good.32 Excluding orders on provisional measures,
there were only four cases of non-compliance with the judgments of the
ICJ in this period.33 While it has not been the subject of significant study
in the international relations literature, the importance of the ICJ in the
scholarship on international law is largely taken for granted. Jeffrey
31. I.C.J., A

GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, COMPOSITION,

JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND

available at, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbookBbookchapterl.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). For a detailed analysis of the recent
increase in the ICJ caseload, see D.W. BOWETT ET. AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
DECISIONS OF THE COURT,

JUSTICE: PROCESS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

(J.P. Gardner & Chanaka Wickremasinghe

eds., 1997).
32. Enforcement of ICJ judgments rests with the Security Council. See U.N.

art. 94, para. 2. On compliance with ICJ judgments, See COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 7-46 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kuijer eds., 1996).

CHARTER

JUDGMENTS OF

33. These four cases are Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), which was recently settled following the collapse of the Stalinist government in Albania, Icelandic Fisheries (U.K. v. Ice.),
Iranian Hostages (U.S. v. Iran), and Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.). See
S.M. SCHWEBEL, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS,

supra note 32, at 39, 40-41.
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Kovar, a Deputy Assistant Legal Adviser in the U.S. State Department,
expresses a common view in the international law community when he
writes that the ICJ is "the premier international forum for the resolution
of international disputes. 34
Legal teams before the Court are led by agents, who act on behalf of
the governments they represent. An agent can be likened to "the head of
a special diplomatic mission with powers to commit a sovereign
State."3 Very often, the parties' ambassadors to The Hague are chosen
to serve as agents. Agents are aided by counsel and advocates who
"assist... in the preparation of the pleadings and the delivery of oral
argument."36 These subordinate team members are also selected by the
governments they represent. Counsel and advocates need not be citizens
of the states they represent, but "are chosen from among those practitioners, professors of international law and jurists of all countries who
appear most qualified to present the view of the country that appoints
them. In practice, they form a group of specialists which was once fairly
limited, but which now is tending to expand."37
Cases are brought before the Court either as a result of a special bilateral agreement between states, or by one state's unilateral application.
Parties to a case submitted by application may raise preliminary objections, which require hearings on whether the Court has jurisdiction over
the dispute. Parties may elect not even to appear before the Court, as
Iran did in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, and
the United States did in the merits phase of Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua.If the Court decides that it has jurisdiction, proceedings may continue even in cases of non-appearance.
Finally, third parties may request permission to intervene if they have
an interest in the outcome of a dispute between other states.
Once the case is underway, the proceedings themselves are divided
into written and oral stages. The oral proceedings follow the written,
and take place in public sittings at the Great Hall of Justice. The members of each party's legal team present various aspects of their state's
34. Jeffrey D. Kovar, InternationalLitigation: InternationalLaw & Resolution of Inter-

national Disputes, in

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

221, 226

(Ellen G. Schaffer & Randall Snyder eds., 1997).

35. I.C.J., A

GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND

available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbook/Bbookchapter3.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). Rosenne describes agents as
essentially "political" figures. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920-1996, at 1170-71 (3d ed. 1997).
36. I.C.J., supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. For a description of the ceremonial aspects of the oral proceedings, see ROSENNE,
supra note 2, at 128-29.
DECISIONS OF THE COURT,
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case. Judges are allowed to pose questions to the speakers, but have
done so very rarely.39 When questions are asked, they tend to come at
the end of the proceedings and the legal teams are allowed time to prepare responses.
Shabtai Rosenne, in a broad review of the functioning of the World
Court, has emphasized the importance of the oral proceedings:
One cannot fail to be struck by the close attention with which
the judges follow the oral statements, for they act as the focusing point for the work of the Court in deciding the case, and
accordingly can have a great impact on the case. Skillful pleading may not win a bad case, but it can mitigate the effect of a
negative decision. ' °
Rosenne admits that the requirements of simultaneous translation can
have a "deadening effect" on the oral proceedings. "This notwithstand4
ing, it is still the hearing which has the most direct impact." '
Keith Highet, a lawyer who has himself appeared before the ICJ on
eleven different occasions representing ten different countries, has also
emphasized the importance of the oral proceedings:
[T]here is no question ... that the written proceedings are subordinate to the oral proceedings. Stilted, lengthy, and even
boring as the oral pleadings may be, it is in this phase that the
parties boil down their cases to the crucial points, that counsel
has to stand up and speak out, and that the judges form opinions. The length, turgidity, complexity and repetitiveness of the
written pleadings make them hard for any but the most diligent
of judges (or counsel) to master. It is at the oral stage that push
comes to shove and that cases are, almost without exception,
won or lost, saved or frittered away. As Article 60, paragraph 1
of the Rules says, the purpose, and indeed the result, of the oral
proceedings is to bring out "the issues that still divide the parties," and not "go over the whole ground covered by the
pleadings, or merely repeat the facts and arguments these contain. , 2
39. I.C.J., A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION, PROCEDURE AND
DECISIONS OF THE COURT, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/
ibbook/Bbookchapter4.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001)..
40. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 129.
41. Id.
42. Keith Highet, Book Review, 86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 400, 402 (1992). Highet's remarks
are in reaction to the assertion of Gill that the oral proceedings are less important than the
written proceedings. See TERRY D. GILL, LITIGATION STRATEGY AT THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT: A CASE STUDY OF THE NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES DISPUTE 89-91 (1989).
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Once oral proceedings conclude, the Court deliberates privately, and
then delivers its judgment in a final public sitting in the Great Hall of
Justice.
II.

THE DATA

In this project we compare the diffusion of international legal norms
among Western and non-Western states. We have adopted current
membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the criterion for identifying Western states. 3 This
measure is imperfect, but its deficiencies are biased against the case we
make here. Israel, Liechtenstein, and South Africa, for example, have all
appeared before the Court and are arguably "Western" despite not being
OECD members. To the extent that these countries have been able to
send legal teams of high national composition to the Court, their categorization as non-Western should bias the results against our
expectations." Meanwhile, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey are OECD
members, yet are arguably non-Western. These states, however, have
not appeared before the ICJ, so their categorization as "Western" has no
impact on the main results presented here.
Our case data come directly from the Proceedingsof the ICJ for the
first fifty years of the Court's operation, from 1948 to 1998. We have
examined every contentious case-brought either by application or
agreement-that included oral proceedings regarding preliminary objections, interim measures, permission to intervene, or merits.4 ' This set
of cases ranges from Corfu Channel (1948) to Fisheries Jurisdiction

(1998). We have also compiled data on the lawyers who participated in

43. Current OECD members (and their year of admittance): Australia (1971), Austria
(1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland
(1969), France (1961), Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961),
Ireland (1961), Italy (1961), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico
(1994), the Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), the United
Kingdom (1961), and the United States (1961). We use the term "Western" because it is
commonly used for this cultural denotation. Of course it is not a geographically perfect categorization. Given the exclusion of the Latin American states, "Northwestern" might be a
more appropriate appellation.
44. Israel and South Africa both sent purely national teams in their respective appearances before the Court. Liechtenstein used one Swiss and three British lawyers in its 1954
appearance in the Notebohm case.
45. The complete list of cases is provided in the appendix. We have included cases in
which only one side appeared. Rosenne explains that "the Court has shown itself capable of
carrying out its task of reaching a decision despite the absence of formal pleadings and evidence by one of the parties." ROSENNE, supra note 2 at 95.
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each sitting of the oral proceedings of these cases.4'6 The data include
information on forty-seven cases, involving fifty countries and 593 legal
team members, argued over the course of approximately 1,000 public
sittings.
It should be noted that in several cases documentation for some of
the sittings is unavailable. There are also eight cases that were too old to
have been detailed on the ICJ's website, yet too recent to be published
in the ICJ's Proceedings series. 47 The missing records prevent us from
tracking attendance over the entire course of the oral proceedings in
records from the final
these cases, but we were always able to utilize
48
sittings, which are generally representative.
A. Legal Teams at the ICJ
In Figure One we summarize the national and non-national composition of the legal teams of the OECD and non-OECD states. Each
vertical bar represents the number of legal teams within each quintile
for the percentage of members of the team that are nationals. Of course,
every team includes at least one national. But the differences between
Western and non-Western states are clearly apparent in the figure. The
Western states tend to use teams with very high national composition,
while the non-Western states tend to use teams with relatively low national composition.
The differences between Western and non-Western states are more
succinctly summarized in Table One, which uses a 60 percent cutoff to
dichotomize the ICJ legal teams on the basis of their national composition. The strong relationship between OECD membership and national
composition of ICJ legal teams can be clearly seen in the main diagonal.

46. We focus exclusively on legal specialists-individuals with such designations as
"agent," "counsel," "advocate," "counsellor," "legal expert," and various combinations
thereof. Other team members, such as secretaries and witnesses, are excluded.
47. These cases include: Certain PhosphateLands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), TerritorialDispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad),East Timor (Portugalv. Austl.), Arbitral Award of 31
July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), the Merits phase of Military and ParamilitaryActivities in
and againstNicar. (Nicar. v. U.S.), and FrontierDispute (Burkina Faso/Republicof Mali).
48. If there is any bias in only looking at the final sittings it should go against our argument since it is the hired non-nationals who sometimes do not show up at the last sitting.
A dramatic example of this is the lengthy Barcelona Traction case. The final sitting was
attended by only four lawyers, two from each side. Only one was a non-national. In contrast,
at the first sitting of this case, there were thirty-six lawyers present, seventeen of whom were
non-nationals.
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FIGURE ONE

OECD MEMBERSHIP AND THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ICJ LEGAL
TEAMS (1948-1998)
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TABLE ONE

OECD MEMBERSHIP AND NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF ICJ LEGAL
TEAMS (1948-1998)

National
Composition
60% or More
Less than 60%
Total
P('[1] > 31.13)=.000

OECD
Member

Non-OECD
Member

Total

46
4
50

18
29
47

64
33
97

Of the 185 states that are members of the United Nations, only sixty
have been parties before the ICJ. 49 Moreover, OECD states make up 35
49. I.C.J., supra 35. This covers the years between 1946 and July, 1996. U.N. membership is as of 1998. Two states on the list of sixty (Turkey and Iceland), were named as
parties, but refused to participate. Two others (Lebanon and Egypt) were only involved in
cases that were terminated by discontinuance. For a discussion of some of the elements in
state decisions to utilize the ICJ, see Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International
Court of Justice, 26 INT'L STUD. Q. 251 (1982).
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percent of the parties that have appeared before. the ICJ, but only account for 16 percent of the states in the United Nations. Our argument is
that the bias in the nationality of international legal practitioners is an
indicator of the limited diffusion of international legal norms. To the
degree that the parties before the ICJ are the more legally-oriented states
in the system, our results should be understated.Those states that do not
even resort to the ICJ are presumably even less integrated into the international legal system. For example, the United States attempted to use
the ICJ to resolve several disputes with the Soviet Union concerning
incidents in which planes were shot at after straying into the airspace of
the Soviet Union or its satellites. In each of these cases the Soviets rejected ICJ jurisdiction. 0 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union never called on
the Court to resolve any of its disputes.'
The ICJ has been most notably underutilized by African and Asian
states.52 China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, for example, have never appeared before the court. In the 1948 to 1998 period, there are only four
cases involving Asian states 3 Table Two shows the regional utilization
of the ICJ and the frequency of teams composed solely of national lawyers.
The data presented in Figure One and in Tables One and Two make
a convincing case that non-Western states tend to have a greater proportion of non-national representation in their appearances before the
Court. Nonetheless, there are a number of discrepant cases in the offdiagonal. These discrepant cases fall into two categories: there are the
four cases in which Western states have had a relatively high proportion
of non-national representation; and there are the seventeen cases in
which non-Western states have had a low proportion of non-national

50. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America (U.S. v
Hung., U.S. v U.S.S.R.); Aerial Incident of October 7th, 1952 (U.S. v U.S.S.R., 1956); and
Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (U.S. v U.S.S.R., 1956).
51. See GILL supra note 42, at 15-17. There is some evidence that Gorbachev was interested in increasing Soviet involvement in the ICJ, but that experiment was cut short. See
NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 232-

33 (Martinus Nignoff Publishers, 1989). Earlier Soviet distrust of the ICJ is reflected in the
title of a 1950 article by a prominent Soviet jurist, E.A. Korovin, The InternationalCourt in
the Service of Anglo-American Imperialismcited in ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 258.
52. See R.P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of
InternationalLaw, in THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW (F.E. Snyder
and S. Sathirathai, eds., 1987).

53. These four cases are: the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the Temple
at Preah Vihear in 1962; The Portugal v. India dispute in the Indian Territory case (1960);
Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO (Pak. v India, 1972); and the Pakistani
POWs Case (Pak. v India, 1973). Table Two only shows 6 appearances before the Court
because India did not participate in the Pakistani POWs case.
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representation. We turn our attention to these apparent discrepancies
below.
TABLE
NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF

Region
Northern Europe
North America
Asia
Middle East
Oceania
Latin America
Southern &

ICJ

Two

LEGAL TEAMS BY REGION

(1948-1998)

All-National
Legal Teams

Total Legal
Teams

Percentage
All National

19
7
3
1
1
2
1

28
11
6
4
5
12
12

68%
64%
50%
25%
20%
17%
8%

1

19

5%

Eastern Europe

Africa

1. Western Legal Teams with High Non-National Composition
There are four cases in which the legal team of a Western state had
a relatively high non-national composition. These cases are listed in Table Three. Although these Western states had higher than expected
numbers of non-nationals on their legal teams, closer examination of the
actual work performed by these teams' members bears out our expectations.
In its particulars, the Belgian case corresponds most closely to our
anticipated results. A simple way to gauge the relative contributions of
various team members during oral arguments is to calculate the percentage of the total arguments-in pages-that they provided. As is
indicated in the final column of Table Three, of the 1,790 pages of oral
arguments made by the Belgian team in Barcelona Traction, 72 percent
were made by national lawyers. Furthermore, the non-national lawyers
on the Belgian team were all from Western Europe and Canada.
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TABLE THREE

OECD

LEGAL TEAMS WITH HIGH NON-NATIONAL COMPOSITION

Year

Case

1953

Ambatielos

Greece

61%

100%

1964

Barcelona

Belgium

53%

28%

Team

% Non-Nationals %of Oral Argument
by Non-Nationals

Traction

1951

Fisheries

Norway

50%

73%

1964

Barcelona

Spain

42%

68%

Traction

In the other three cases, the use of non-nationals is more substantial.
Just as we have argued for the non-Western states, these outside experts
have played a central role in the legal proceedings. In the Fisheriescase,
Maurice Bourquin-a Swiss lawyer-presented 73 percent of Norway's
oral arguments. Spain's seven non-national lawyers provided 1,014
pages of their team's 1,487 pages of argumentation in Barcelona Traction. In the Greek case, two non-nationals-Belgian Henri Rolin and
Britain's Frank Soskice-made all of the oral arguments. 4
These four discrepant cases highlight our use of a broad definition
for the category of "Western" states. In fact, the practice of international
law before the ICJ is a specialization concentrated in a mere handful of
states. Greece is surely a Western state by our definition, but there are
no Greek international lawyers who have made arguments before the
ICJ as non-nationals. In each of these cases the non-national lawyers
continue to come from the same small set of Western states. In these
ostensibly discrepant cases there is only one international lawyer from a
non-OECD state helping to represent an OECD state. In the Barcelona
Traction Case, Spain included the Uruguayan jurist Eduardo Jiminez de
Arechaga on its legal team. We will return later to the exceptional case
of Jiminez de Arechaga, who went on to become a judge on the court.
2. Non-Western Legal Teams with High National Composition
Most directly problematic for our argument are the eight cases in
which the legal team of a non-Western state had no non-national composition: Colombia in the 1950 Asylum case, Colombia and Cuba in the
1951 Haya de la Torre case (an extension of the 1950 Asylum case), Israel
in the 1959 Aerial Incident case, South Africa in the 1965 Southwest
54. The Greek agent merely introduced his team in a statement spanning barely half a
page. Observations of M. Lely, (Greece v. U.K.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Ambatielos Case) 300
(May 16, 1952).
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Africa case, India and Pakistan in the 1972 ICAO case, and Pakistan in
the 1973 Pakistani POWs case. These eight cases represent just six
states since Colombia and Pakistan each appear on the list twice. Cuba's
role in the Haya de la Torre case was relatively incidental. The Cubans
intervened as a third party into the Colombian-Peruvian asylum dispute
in order to make an assertion about regional asylum conventions. Cuba
sent only one representative-a Cuban-to present its brief case. Israel
and South Africa, of course, have a number of Western characteristics.
Perhaps India and Pakistan can be explained by their strong inheritance
of British legal traditions. As Rosenne explains, "Most of the newly independent States maintain at least to some extent the legal system
inherited from the former colonial power."55
This leaves Colombia as the most significant outlier. As we will
discuss at more length below, however, it is interesting to note that in
contrast to several other similarly positioned states, Colombia has long
had an active legal adviser's office within the foreign ministry. We
would posit that the existence of this exceptional case demonstrates that
when a non-Western state has an effective and well-integrated legal
staff it is possible for it to present its own case.
There are eight other cases in which the legal team of a nonWestern state was composed of greater than 60 percent (but less than
100 percent) nationals. These cases are listed in Table Four. As in the
exceptional Western cases we examined above, a more detailed inspection of the oral transcripts shows that the make-up of these teams is not
always representative of the division of labor between nationals and
non-nationals. The Western bias is more pronounced than is represented
simply by the nationality of the lawyers. The rightmost column in Table
Four again shows the percentage of the oral arguments made by the
non-national lawyers on the team. When non-Western states hire outside
legal representatives, they tend to rely strongly on those representatives
in the oral proceedings. For example, Gilbert Gidel, Peru's French lawyer in Haya de la Torre, provided 79 percent of his team's nineteen
pages of oral argument. In the Asylum case Peru's French lawyer
Georges Schelle provided 79 percent of his team's sixty-six page oral
arguments. In the Northern Cameroons case 90 percent of Cameroon's
oral arguments were made by their non-national lawyer, Prosper Weil.
The Beligian lawyer, Henri Rolin, made 87 percent of the Iranian oral
arguments in th Anglo-Iranian Oil case.
Cameroon's co-Agent, Douala Moutomd, explicitly acknowledges a
division of labor in his opening presentation for the Cameroonian oral
55. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 55.
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pleading in the 1998 Land and Maritime case: "It is neither among my
duties or my capabilities to refute the Nigerian Preliminary Objections
point by point; counsel for Cameroon will deal with that. ' 6 Western
states tend to use national lawyers throughout their oral presentation.
Non-Western states not only hire outside lawyers, but when their national representatives do appear they focus on historical, geographic,
and political factors. The purely legal arguments are most often left to
the non-national lawyers.
TABLE FOUR

NoN-OECD LEGAL TEAMS WITH HIGH NATIONAL COMPOSITION
Year

Case

Team

%NonNationals

%of Oral Argument
by Non-Nationals

1950
1951
1952
1954
1963
1985
1986
1990
1991

Asylum
Haya de laTorre
Anglo-Iranian
Nottebohm
N.Cameroons
Cont. Shelf
Frontier Dispute
Land.. Maritime
ArbitralAward

Peru
Peru
Iran
Guatemala
Cameroon
Tunisia
Mali
El Salvador
Senegal

16%
16%
22%
32%
14%
40%
36%
36%
38%

79%
79%
87%
85%
90%
80%
NA*
NA*
NA*

1998

Land/Maritime

Cameroon

25%

57V t

*
At the time of this research, The Mali, El Salvador, and Senegal cases had not yet had their
full
proceedings published, and were not recent enough to appear on the ICJ web site. The percentage of
non-nationals inthese cases comes from the final sitting.
t The percentage inthis case is based on word counts (rather than page counts) because the
proceedings were only available on-line.

3. Non-National Lawyers Before the ICJ
An alternative standpoint from which to gain perspective on this issue is to shift the focus from the legal teams to the individual lawyers.
When we look at the individual lawyers who have appeared before the
ICJ, the evidence remains equally dramatic. Table Five lists the states
that have produced lawyers who have served as non-nationals on ICJ
legal teams. Of the 148 lawyers who have served on foreign teams, only
six (4 percent) are citizens of non-OECD states. 7 Of the forty-four
56. Oral Pleadings of Cameroon, Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon. v. Nig.), at 37
(Mar. 5, 1998), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icncr/cnicr9803_
translation.htm, Mr. Moutomd's testimony (last visited Nov. 9, 2000).
57. The list is also overwhelmingly male, with only ten discernable female first names.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 22:239

lawyers who have appeared before the court representing a foreign
country more than once, only one is from a non-OECD state. When nonnational lawyers are hired, 77 percent of the time they have come from
just five countries: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Italy. Only eleven states have produced more than one lawyer
who has appeared as a non-national before the ICJ. Only nine states
have produced lawyers who have appeared more than once in that role.
TABLE FIVE
CITIZENSHIP OF NON-NATIONAL LAWYERS ON

ICJ LEGAL

TEAMS

(1948-1998)

OECD States
State

Number of Lawyers

Number of
Appearances

France
UK
US
Belgium
Italy
Spain
Switzerland
Germany
Netherlands
Australia
Portugal
Canada
Japan
Denmark

35
35
27
9
8
8
6
5
2
2
2
1
1
1

78
74
48
22
10
8
10
6
2
2
2
1
1
1

Total - OECD

142

265
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TABLE FIVE (CONTINUED)

State

Non-OECD States
Number of Lawyers

Number of
Appearances

Uruguay
Czechoslovakia
India
Israel
Liberia
Madagascar
Total-non-OECD
GRAND TOTAL

1
1
1
1
1
1
6

6
1
1
1
1
1
11

148

276

Table Six lists the ten lawyers who have represented foreign countries before the ICJ five or more times. Only two of these lawyers have
ever represented their own states before the ICJ. Bowett represented the
UK in the 1973 Fisheries Jurisdictioncase and Rolin appeared for Belgium in the 1964 Barcelona Traction case. The distinguished
Uruguayan jurist Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga is the one non-OECD
standout in this list-and the only non-OECD citizen to have represented a foreign state more than once before the ICJ.
Jiminez de Arechega is clearly a significant exception to our argument. At the same time, he demonstrates the possibility of precisely the
process of diffusion we would expect to see more often. Jiminez de
Arechaga was born in Montevideo in 1918, and earned his Doctor of
Law at the University of Uruguay in 1942. He was a professor of international law at the Montevideo Law School, and went on to hold a
number of positions both within the Uruguayan government and in the
United Nations. He joined the Court as a judge in 1970, and was elected
President of the Court in 1976. Jiminez de Arechaga retired in 1979. In
three of his six appearances he represented an OECD state.58 Five of his
six appearances before the Court came after his retirement. Still, his
education in Uruguay coupled with his frequent appearances before the

58. Jiminez de Arechaga was part of the Spanish team that argued the Barcelona Traction case in 1964. He helped represent Australia in Certain Phosphate Lands in 1992, and
Denmark in its 1993 Maritime Delimitation case.
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Court as a non-national legal expert make him a significant but singular
outlier in our data.
TABLE SIX
NON-NATIONAL LAWYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE APPEARANCES
BEFORE THE

Name
Derek Bowett
Keith Highet
Ian Brownie
Prosper Weil
Richard Meese
Elihu Lauterpacht
Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga
Alain Pellet
Henri Rolin
Pierre-Marie Dupuy

ICJ (1948-1998)

Citizenship

Appearances on
Foreign Teams

United Kingdom
United States
United Kingdom
France
France
United Kingdom
Uruguay
France
Belgium
France

11
11
9
9
8
7
6
6
6
5

Although our analysis has been focused on the lawyers who practice
international law, a brief look at the backgrounds of the judges who sit
behind the bench provides further support for our argument that international legal norms are still relatively weakly diffused through the
international system.
B. The ICJ Judges
The first attempt to set up a standing international court with permanent judges faltered over the issue of the apportionment of judges by
nationality." At the 1907 Hague Conference the large states and small
states could not agree on a formula for the terms of judges that would
ensure the kind of diversity demanded by the smaller powers. This disagreement arose despite the American Secretary of State Elihu Root's
admonition to the American delegation that the new full time judges
"should be so selected from the different countries that the different
systems of law and procedure and the principal languages shall be fairly
represented."6
59. See ROBERT KLEIN, THE IDEA OF EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE
TENSION BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF GREAT-POWER PRIMACY AND THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY 83-87 (1966).
60. I.C.J., supra 31.
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The principles of national diversity and the representation of diverse
legal systems in the appointment of judges have been maintained in the
current rules for electing ICJ judges. Article 9 of the Statute of the ICJ
spells out the diversity emphasis:
At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that
the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured.6'
This basic principle is clearly followed in terms of nationalities. The
current roster of ICJ judges includes jurists from a broad range of states.
Seven of the current judges are from OECD states, and eight are from
non-OECD states. According to Shahabuddeen, the Court has succeeded
in ensuring diversity and representation: "To some extent in composition, but to an even greater extent in outlook, the Court as a whole has
been moving in the direction of keeping pace with the evolving character and structure of the international community. 62
This appraisal may be overly optimistic. Rosenne observes that although nationality and regional representation is a significant element in
the election of judges, "the representation of legal systems does not appear to constitute a major factor in the election process. 63 While the
judges may be influenced by their national philosophies, ideologies and
religions, they are usually trained in either continental Civil Law or Anglo-American Common Law." It takes only a cursory look at the
backgrounds of the current judges to raise questions about the international character of modern international law.
Tables Seven and Eight list the current OECD and non-OECD ICJ
judges respectively with their nationalities and educational backgrounds. In both tables, schools in OECD states are indicated by
italicized bold text. All seven of the OECD judges in Table Seven have
been educated entirely in OECD states. But, as shown in Table Eight, all
but one of the non-OECD judges also received a significant part of his
legal education in an OECD state. The single exception is the Russian
judge, Vladlen Vereshchetin, who received his legal education at the

61. I.C.J. Statute, art. 9. See also ROSENNE supra note 2, at 54-62.
62. Mohamed Shahabuddeen, The World Court at the Turn of the Century, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 14 (A. Sam Muller, D.
Raic, and J.M Thurfnszky, eds., 1997).
63. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 59.
64. Id. at 60.
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University of MOSCOW. Of the fifteen judges currently on the ICJ
bench, all but one of them received a significant part of his or her legal
education in OECD states.66 The OECD criterion is a little sloppy in
evaluating the Western educational connections of the ICJ judges, since
we might not want to include education in Hungary in the 1950s as
Western. Still, all but three of the fifteen judges received a significant
part of their legal training in just four countries: France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
TABLE SEVEN

ICJ JUDGES FROM OECD

STATES:

NATIONALITY AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

Name

Citizenship

Shigeru Oda

Japan

Legal Education
Law degree, Univ. of Tokyo

JSD, Yale Univ.
Dr. of Law, Univ. of Tohoku
Gilbert Guillaume

France

BA, law, Univ. of Paris
Dipl6me, Paris Institute of Pol. Studies

Diploma, Univ. of Paris
Gaza Herczegh

Hungary

Carl-August Fleischhauer

Germany

BA, Ph.D., U. of Szeged (Hungary)
First State Exam (Law), Heidelberg
Fulbright Scholar, U.of Chicago Law
School
Dr. jur., Heidelberg
Second State Exam (Law), Stuttgart

Rosalyn Higgins

United Kingdom

BA, LL.B. MA Cambridge

JSD, Yale
Pieter H. Kooijmans

Netherlands

Econ. B., LL.M. Dr. luris, Free U.,

Thomas Buergenthal

United States

JD New York Univ.

Amsterdam
LL.M, JSD Harvard

65. On this issue our use of OECD membership as a proxy for 'Western' may bias the
results in our favor. But even a more narrow view of the 'Western' category would only
change the results by one, removing G6za Herczegh-who received his education entirely in
Hungary-from the list. A more narrow definition of the West would also treat Shigeru
Oda's Japanese education differently, but his JSD from Yale University would keep him on
the list of Western educated judges.
66. Prott, writing in 1979, makes a similar point about the roster of judges up until
1979, all of whom but one had received some part of their legal training in a "Western-type
legal system." The one exception in that earlier period is Judge Wellington Koo who had no
formal legal training. LYNDELL V. PROTT, THE LATENT POWER OF CULTURE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL JUDGE

203 (1979).
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TABLE EIGHT

NoN-OECD ICJ JUDGES:
NATIONALITY AND EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

Name
Mohammed Bedjaoui
Raymond Ranjeva

Citizenship
Algeria
Madagascar

Legal Education
Diploma Univ. of Grenoble
Dr. of Law, Univ. of Grenoble
BA, law, U.of Madagascar.
Diploma, Madagascar Nat'l School of Admin.
Trainee, JudicialDiv., Conseil d'Etat, Paris
Advanced diploma, Pol. Sci. Univ. of Paris
Advanced diploma, Int'l Law, U.of Madagascar
Dr. of Law, Univ. of Paris

Shi Jiuyong

China

Abdul G. Koroma

Sierra Leone

BA., Gov't and Public Law, St. John's U.,
Shanghai
M.A., Int'l. Law, Columbia U.
LL.M., U.of Kiev
M.Phil. (Int'l Law), U. of London

Vladlen S. Vereshchetin

Russia

BA, Dr. Jur. Sc., Moscow Institute of Int'l
Relations

Gonzalo ParraAranguren

Venezuela

BA, Juridical and Pol. Sci., Central U.
Venezuela
LL.M., New York University
Dr. Law, Ludwig-Maximileans U., Munich

Francisco Rezek

Brazil

Awn Shawkat

Jordan

LL.B, D.E.S. U.of Minas Gerais
Dr., Sorbonne
Diploma in Law, Oxford

M.A., LL.M., Cambridge

AI-Khasawneh
Source (Tables Seven and Eight): ICJ Biographies at http://www.icpcij.orgicjwww/igeneralinformation/
igncompos.html (visited 1/28/01). Schools in OECD states are indicated by italicized bold text. The
exact title of the undergraduate degrees is not always made clear inthe official biographies. Inthe interest of space, we have substituted 'BA' where the exact title is not discernable.

III. Is INTERNATIONAL LAW "INTERNATIONAL"?
The reality of Western predominance in the practice of international
law before the ICJ is very clear. Does this predominance undermine the
internationalcharacter of international law? Our consideration of this
question proceeds in four steps. We begin by outlining some of the implications of the nationality of its practitioners on the character and
content of international law. We then look at the existing comparative
work on the role of legal advisers in the foreign policy process. We next
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confront the argument that the phenomenon we observe is merely a reflection of benign functional specialization. Finally, we set out some of
the positive reasons that states might want to use national lawyers before the ICJ.
A. Nationality and InternationalLegal Norms
In a world governed by truly universal international legal norms the
nationality of lawyers and judges would be irrelevant. Cameroon could
be represented by a Belgian lawyer, and Belgium could be represented
by a Cameroonian lawyer. But as we have shown, the former happens
frequently, while the latter happens not at all. The overwhelmingly
Western character of the lawyers who appear before the ICJ suggests
that nationality is not yet irrelevant for the practice of international law.
The significance of the lack of national diversity in the practice of international law can be seen both theoretically and empirically.
Lawyers from different legal traditions compete to assert their legal
values at the international level.67 We have already set out an argument
that Western and non-Western states may have different perspectives on
the character and content of international law. One could go further to
point to the significant differences of perspective even within these two
groups, but the larger dichotomy is adequate for our purposes. We have
also already outlined the epistemic communities approach and the argument that legal norms are carried by individuals, and thus that the
characteristics of these individuals matters. International law is defined
by its practitioners. Where different perspectives on international law
are defined by national boundaries, states will want to have their own
practitioners to ensure that the law is defined in the ways that they prefer.
There is a large body of literature on the relationship between representatives and their clients. States want to choose experienced and
capable lawyers. But, precisely because of the gap between the knowledge of the representative and that of the state, the state has to worry
about maintaining control over the representative. The extent to which
non-OECD states rely on hired non-national legal expertise is surprising
from this agency-theoretic perspective. A principal (the state) tries not
merely to secure the most skilled agent, but also to minimize "agency
losses"-the costs incurred by a principal as a result of an agent's failing to pursue fully the principal's interests.

67. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 24, Trubek, et. al. supra note 24; Bourdieu, supra
note 4.
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Two important means of minimizing these losses are monitoring
and interest alignment. A closely monitored agent will be more likely to
carry out a principal's wishes. Monitoring can be difficult, however,
when the agent has specialized knowledge that the principal does not
share. When monitoring is difficult, interest alignment becomes more
important. If an agent's interests are congruent with the principal's, he
or she can be expected to act as the principal desires even in the absence
of close monitoring. As Pratt and Zeckhauser explain, "agency loss is
the most severe when the interests or values of the principal and agent
diverge substantially, and information monitoring is costly."68 Garth and
Dezalay describe just such a situation in the area of international commercial arbitration. They suggest that Third World States are caught in a
bind because they lack adequate competence internally, but carry a significant fear of dispossession by the experts they have to hire to
represent them internationally.69
From the agency-theoretic perspective, an ideal legal representative
for a state appearing before the ICJ would not only be a skilled international lawyer, but a lawyer whose actions can be monitored, or whose
interests are aligned with those of the state he or she represents. All
things being equal, national lawyers in regular government service
should be more easily monitored and are more likely to share their
state's interests. The advantages of relying on such agents are nicely
summarized by Pratt and Zeckhauser: "Those who share one's objectives tend to carry them out; monitoring and conflict are reduced, and
such people may even make themselves available at a cheaper price."70
1. Finally, there is empirical evidence from other contexts that states
care intensely about the nationality of their representatives. It is difficult
to imagine, for example, a state sending a non-national to represent its
interests before the United Nations. States take the nationality of the
individuals in international organizations very seriously. As we saw
above, states demand geographic diversity in the selection of ICJ
judges. The International Law Commission-a UN organization
charged with the progressive development and codification of international law-uses a quota system to ensure diverse regional
representation.7 Herbert Briggs notes that "the basic requirement that
the commission shall be persons of recognized competence in international law has, on occasion been minimized in the preoccupation with
68.

JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCOF BUSINESS 5 (1985).
69. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 24, at 66-69, 96-97.
70. PRATT & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 68 at 15.
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political and geographical factors."" Similarly, Article 101 of the
United Nations Charter calls for "as wide a geographical basis as possible" in the staffing of the United Nations. Houshang Ameri has asserted
that the "principles contained in Article 101 continue to be perhaps the
most discussed, and therefore sensitive, principles contained in the totality of the U.N. Charter."73 The intense concerns of non-Western states
about the implementation of the diversity principle in international organizations has not translated into a willingness to use their own
nationals to represent them before the ICJ.
B. Legal Advising in Non-Western States
There are, then, a number of reasons why states should care about
the nationality of their legal representatives. The Western bias in international legal practice at the ICJ tells us something significant about the
distribution of capacity to participate fully in the international legal
system. The relative paucity of non-OECD lawyers who appear before
the ICJ reflects directly on the international legal infrastructure within
non-OECD states.
If international law were truly international, we would expect all
states to need a cadre of international lawyers to help them make effective use of international law and the international legal system.74 They
should be training their own international lawyers to work within their
foreign policy establishment, both to help them stay within the bounds
of law, and to take advantage of the law where opportunities arise. Foreign office staff lawyers should be specialists on the issues that most
affect their countries. We would expect to see these staff lawyers show
up more often and make a more significant contribution before the ICJ.
There have been only a few attempts to directly assess the nature of
legal advisers in the foreign policy machinery of states. The American
Society of International Law (ASIL) sponsored a small conference of
legal officials and scholars from twelve countries in 1963." Although
quite dated, this study still offers several conclusions that suggest support for the argument we make here. For example, the authors assert
that calling upon "distinguished lawyers from outside the government
establishment, including lawyers from foreign countries.., especially
72. Quoted in Id. at 16.
73. HOUSHANG AMERI,

POLITICS OF STAFFING THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

151

(1996).
74. See Antonio Cassese, The Role of Legal Advisers in Ensuring that Foreign Policy
MICH. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992).

Conforms to International Legal Standards 14

75. H.C.L.

MERILLAT, LEGAL ADVISERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(1964). Participants

came from Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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[occurs] in countries where there is not yet a group of experienced international lawyers."76 The study also asserts that "the tendency...
appears to be to concentrate more and more on legal advising and legal
representation in the regular government establishment."" But, as is
noted in the study, "the evolution of a legal advisory service in foreign
affairs, commanding respect and to which matters of highest importance
are entrusted, is naturally related to the availability of highly competent,
well-trained, and experienced lawyers within the country, and within the
government of the country."78
In the details of the ASIL report it becomes clear that the nonOECD participants exhibited relatively weak institutions for incorporating international law into foreign policy. For Malaysia and Nigeria,
this could be attributed to their only recent acquisition of full sovereignty. In both of those states there was no explicit legal adviser within
the foreign ministry. Instead the foreign ministry had to solicit opinions
from the ministry of justice, which was tasked with dealing with all aspects of law, both domestic and international, and thus was not a part of
day-to-day foreign policy making.79 But even in a long-established state
like Mexico, the institutionalization of legal advice in foreign policy
making was described as problematic, "There does not exist, in a direct
manner, a separate organization for legal advice or planning in matters
pertaining to foreign policy. '80 The problems of incorporating international law into the making of foreign policy are identified as stemming,
"in the first place... from a general evil, namely the lack of experts in a
sufficient number."8'
The Philippines did have an Office of Legal Affairs within the Department of Foreign Affairs, but its legal focus is open to question,
given that it was tasked not only with "providing legal assistance, as
required by other offices and divisions of the Department" but also,
among other things, with providing general research services to the
other departments, collecting biographic information that could help in
the formation and implementation of foreign policy, the translation of
all communications received in foreign languages, the editing of all
documents published by the Department, the enlargement and maintenance of the Department's library, and the compilation and maintenance
of the official history of the Department and of the foreign affairs of the
Philippines!
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id. at 29-30.

78. Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 67-70 (Malaysia) and 84-89 (Nigeria).
80. Id. at 72.

81. Id. at 75.
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Colombia, on the other hand, did have a specific legal office in the
Foreign Affairs Ministry. As we saw above, it is one of the handful of
non-OECD states that have appeared before the ICJ without nonnational representation. In both of its 1950's appearances before the
court, Colombia used only Colombian lawyers, and a significant part of
its oral arguments were presented by the legal adviser himself.
More recently, Antonio Cassese has attempted to assay the role of
legal advisers in disciplining foreign policy. Cassese describes the
"traditional" role of legal advisers in representing their states in international litigation." But his study is also limited to a small number of
states." He readily admits that resources prevented him from extending
the research to a significant sample of non-Western states, and that the
non-Western states proved less willing to participate in the study. Only
three non-OECD states were included in his sample-Brazil, Bulgaria,
and Israel-and Brazil and Bulgaria receive only passing mention in the
analysis.
Cassese also points to the problem of assessing the impact of legal
offices through interviews with only a handful of individuals from each
state.85 Different participants often tell different stories about the development and implementation of foreign policy. The fact that a state has a
legal advisers office does not mean that it uses the office in an effective
way-as several participants in Cassese's study were quick to point out.
Switzerland, the United States and the United Kingdom are singled out
as having legal advisers who are well integrated into the foreign policy
process. Cassese suggests that the critical factor is size: "most large
countries tend to effectively integrate legal staffs into their foreign
ministries. 86 "Countries with small legal staffs often relegate them to
more purely bureaucratic roles."87 He does not provide a direct accounting so it is difficult to assess this assertion. Of the three states he
explicitly describes as having well-integrated legal advisers, the U.S. is
clearly a large country, but Switzerland is as clearly small. Brazil has
more than twice the population of the U.K., but is criticized along with
Ireland, Italy (which has roughly the same population as the U.K.),

82. Cassese, supra note 74, at 142.
83. Cassese's sample included Brazil, Bulgaria, Ireland, France, Hungary, Israel, Italy,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. Id. at 140.
84. Id. at 141.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 160.
87. Id. at 149. One cannot help suspect that the causality runs the other way here: countries that relegate their international lawyers to more purely bureaucratic roles tend to have
smaller legal staffs.
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Hungary, Bulgaria, and Israel for having too few international lawyers
in their foreign ministries."
Although limited by the small numbers of states that could be surveyed, and by the problems of assessing true impact beyond the label on
an organizational chart, both the ASIL and the Cassese studies emphasize the importance of the legal advising function for the legal constraint
of foreign policy-making, and lend support to our assertion that the nonWestern states may have limited domestic resources for participation in
the international legal system.
This same institutional weakness can be more broadly observed in
the data on legal practitioners before the ICJ. The primary critique of
this argument will be that the bias we document is simply a form of benign functional specialization. It is to this important critique that we
now turn.
C. The Question of Specialization
In principle, lawyers are advocates without underlying loyalties. It
may be that foreign lawyers are hired because of the need for specialists. Few of us would venture before a tax court without taking along an
attorney who specializes in taxation. Here the old adage that someone
who engages in self-representation "has a fool for a client" comes to
mind. States want to find the best lawyers that are available, and these
tend to be a small number of Europeans and Americans. Rosenne offers
this basic explanation: "There has grown up over the years a small
group of international lawyers, drawn mainly from the legal professions
of Belgium, England, France, Italy, Switzerland and the United States,
who have specialized in practice in the International Court."89
1. The Supreme Court as Analogue
A starting point for thinking about the specialization argument is to
draw a comparison to legal practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court Bar is clearly a highly specialized form of legal practice.
It can be dangerous for a litigant to go before the Court without a representative steeped in its special kind of legal practice. 9° In Supreme Court
oral proceedings, the lawyers have just thirty minutes to make their
case. Furthermore, they must make this case in the face of a style of
vigorous questioning from the bench that gives the process a character

88. Id. at 167.
89. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 120.
90. McGUIRE, supra note 24, at ch. 1.
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that one practitioner has likened to "walking into a buzz saw."9' The
style of argument and kinds of issues that are raised before the Supreme
Court are also significantly different from those of the lower courts.92
Thus, there are strong incentives for specialization in the Supreme Court
bar.
Supreme Court practice has been described as dominated by Washington lawyers.93 Nonetheless, this domination is nothing like the
concentration we have documented in ICJ practice. During the 1986-87
Supreme Court session, just 8.2 percent of the Supreme Court bar came
from Washington.94 Adding New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, the top five cities still account for less than 30 percent of Supreme Court practice. 9 This compares to the 71 percent of ICJ nonnational practitioners who come from just three countries: France, the
United States, and the United Kingdom.96
The Supreme Court analogy is even more telling for our argument
when we break Supreme Court practice down by the kind of litigant.
The highly specialized Supreme Court practitioners are almost always
representing private parties. The most relevant comparison set for our
argument is those cases in which an American state has been represented before the Court. Between 1950 and 1997 American states were
parties before the Supreme Court sixty-three times. In all but five of
those cases (92 percent) the state's oral argument was made by a state
official, rather than a hired specialist. 97 Even the smallest American
states have staffs tasked with managing their legal affairs. When those
affairs take the state before the High Court, it is the state's own legal
staff that stands before the bench.
A central lesson of the Supreme Court analogy-that there are differences between private parties and state actors-has a broader
relevance for thinking about international relations. On this issue, as
many others, the analogy between states and individuals is flawed. Returning to our previous example, most individuals have neither the need
nor the resources to keep a tax lawyer occupied year round. States do
have the resources to keep international lawyers on the payroll if they
view that as a priority. If states want to incorporate international law

91. Id. at 49.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
OF THE

Id. at 1-6.
Id. at 128-70.
Id. at 38.

Id.
See, supra Table Five.
Data compiled from LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS
UNITED STATES (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.)

OF THE SUPREME COURT
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into the process of developing and evaluating foreign policy, we would
expect them to have the necessary international legal specialists on staff.
2. The Limits of Functional Specialization
The specialization argument also fails to hold up under more careful
scrutiny of the individual cases. Most importantly, an informed look at
the list of the lawyers who appear most often as "hired guns" (Table
Six) shows that most of these advocates are generalists, rather than specialists. Elihu Lauterpacht, for example, is the author or editor of books
on a wide range of international legal issues. Keith Highet has published
American Journal of InternationalLaw summaries of a wide range of
legal decisions; reviews of books on intervention in the ICJ, and on
compulsory jurisdiction before the ICJ; a review of a general international law textbook; and a review of a book by Elihu Lauterpacht on the
administration of international justice. Prosper Weil has published articles on "normativity" in international law, and on the right of the Court
to refuse judgement on unclear cases (the non liquet principle).
It might be argued that these lawyers are specialists at arguing before the ICJ, rather than specialists in particular substantive areas of the
law. Keith Highet, for example, has described the ICJ bar as:
those international lawyers who have practiced and continue to
practice as oral advocates before the Court, who represent a variety of foreign states other than their own governments, who
are well-known to the Judges and Registrar of the Court, who
know how things work out in practice, and who understand by
experience the difficulties, pitfalls and tricks of the trade. 98
Of course, by dint of their considerable experience these eminences
are specialists at appearing before the ICJ. Keith Highet has himself
been involved in nearly a quarter of the contentious cases that have
come before the ICJ. But this functional argument would predict that all
states would utilize specialists for this process. It cannot account for the
fact that Western states tend to use their own counsel, while nonWestern states rely on the ICJ bar. The most prominent ICJ specialists,
as listed in Table Six, have been called on to represent their own states
only two times. They have represented non-Western states twice as often as they have represented the OECD states.
Moreover, given the nature of ICJ proceedings it is not obvious that
specialization in ICJ oral presentations would be very functional.
98. Keith Highet, A Personal Memoir of Eduardo Jiminez de Arechaga: Doyen of the
Invisible Bar of the International Court, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. MTG. PROC. 577, 579
(1994).
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Although important, oral argument is just one part of the overall presentation of a case before the ICJ. Oral arguments are almost always
prepared statements that are simply read verbatim without the spirited
kind of back and forth that one sees, for example, in the United States
Supreme Court.99 The oral phase in most ICJ cases has been conducted
with no questions from the bench at all. When the judges do have questions to ask of the advocates, they usually hold their questions until the
end of the oral presentations and allow the lawyers time to prepare a
written response.' ° There is little reason, then, to expect the system to
evolve into one in which some lawyers specialize in presentation, as you
find in a domestic legal system where the vagaries of the jury system
require a class of lawyers with a flair for flamboyant or emotive presentation.' ° ' Keith Highet, while arguing for the importance of0 the
oral
2
"boring."'
and
"stilted"
usually
are
they
that
admits
proceedings
It may be a different kind of flamboyance that non-Western states
are seeking to purchase. States may present their cases through a distinguished professor of international law from Oxford or Yale in order to
legitimatize their arguments in the eyes of the Court. But what would it
say about the universality of international law to suggest that the Court
can be influenced by the European lineage of the lawyers before it? The
possibility that it takes a Western legal scholar to legitimate an oral
presentation at the ICJ would only strengthen our argument that international law is seen as the special purview of a small number of
Western states.
Specialization itself, therefore, cannot explain the domination of ICJ
practice by a handful of American and European lawyers. Even if we
accept that states will seek specialized experts as their advocates before
international tribunals, we would still expect to see a broader international distribution of these experts. If international law were truly
international, the specialization argument would lead us to expect to see
some Indian or Nigerian lawyers representing Belgium or the Netherlands. The assertion that non-Western states simply do not have the
99. See GILL, supra note 42, at 90. Sir Robert Jennings, a former ICJ judge, explains
that "[t]he needs of the simultaneous translators encourage, if not almost require, virtual
recital of a prepared text." quoted in ROSENNE, supra note 35, at 1319. On the difficulty of
Supreme Court oral arguments, See McGUIRE, supra note 24, at 49-52.
100. See, e.g., the questions asked at the end of Libya v. U.K., (oral pleading, CR97/24.
10/22/97) http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iluk/ilukcr/iluk_icr9724.htm (visited 11/9/00).
As Rosenne observes, "It is not customary to interrupt a speech with questions, but questions
are sometimes put when there is a break in presentation. The traditional coffee-break about
half way through a session often affords an opportunity for this." ROSENNE, supra note 35, at
1340.
101. See ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 129.
102. Highet, supra note 42, at 402.
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resources, infrastructure, legal traditions, language skills, or whatever to
have an adequate level of indigenous legal expertise for representation
before the ICJ only makes our case for us.
D. The Casefor National Representation
Thus far, we have made the case that benign functional specialization is not an adequate explanation for the geographic bias we have
identified in ICJ practice. A case can also be made for the functional
advantages of using national representatives to present arguments before the ICJ. Derek Bowett, who sits with Keith Highet on the top of our
list of hired specialists, recommends the use of national lawyers:
So far as the lawyers are concerned, a strong "internal" element
is always desirable. This increases the government's confidence
in the team and also makes the presentation of the case in Court
more impressive, adding to the perception that the case is important to the government.' 3
Bowett suggests two distinct logics for national representation. In
the first place, as we discuss above, principle-agent problems can be
minimized with the strong participation of a state's own lawyers. The
arguments made before the ICJ help define international legal norms. If,
as we have suggested is likely, non-OECD states have distinctive beliefs
about those norms, they should feel more comfortable being represented
by lawyers whose own beliefs they can more easily monitor. Dezalay
and Garth suggest just such a dynamic in the evolution of private international law. In that realm too, they suggest that there is a dearth of
national lawyers to represent Third World countries.'O Third World
states must turn to outsiders, but are concerned that they will not be able
to control their legal representatives. 5 To deal with this agency problem, non-Western countries tend to rely on a coterie of what Dezalay
and Garth call "turncoat" lawyers who express more sympathetic legal
doctrines.' °6 It is unlikely that anyone would use that label to describe
the likes of Derek Bowett, Keith Highet, or Ian Brownlie.
Bowett's second logic is that the use of national lawyers sends a
signal to the Court about the state's attitude toward the case and international law more generally. Unlike the increasingly bare-knuckled
litigation in international arbitration described by Dezalay and Garth,' 7
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

BOWETT et al., supra note 31, at 13.
Dezalay & Garth, supra note 24, at 66.
See id. at 68-69.
See id. at 71.
See generally, DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 24.
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this would seem a relatively safe strategy for ICJ oral presentations. The
oral presentations, which are usually read verbatim, can always be reviewed, or even written by hired specialists. Even if states hire outside
counsel to help them prepare their cases and to deal with the procedural
nuances of the ICJ, there is no reason for them not to put their own nationals before the Court in the oral proceedings.
Given both the limited functional advantages of hiring Western specialists and the positive benefits of using national lawyers to make a
significant part of the oral presentations before the ICJ, we can only
conclude that their absence in this forum points to a broader shortage of
international legal expertise within the foreign policy institutions of
non-Western states. The practice of international law remains the province of a small group of Western specialists. The notion that
international legal norms have attained a genuine universality is belied
by this state of affairs.
E. Prospectsfor Change
The dominance of Western legal expertise in the formation and
conduct of international law in the past may not be an accurate indicator
of future developments. In a review of its first fifty years of operation,
the ICJ pointed to the small group of non-national lawyers who have
appeared before the Court, and argued that it is expanding.' 8 This may
be true, but it primarily reflects the increasing use of non-national lawyers by non-Western states. There has been no increase in the use of
non-Westerners to argue before the Court. Indeed, the non-Western
states have gone from legal teams with an average composition of about
45 percent non-nationals in the 1960s to an average of about 60 percent
non-nationals in the 1980s and 1990s.' 09 There is no trend towards increasing reliance on national lawyers by the non-Western states. Indeed,
the last time a non-Western state appeared before the court without
Western legal representation was in 1973-a quarter of a century ago.
Nor is there any evidence that either Western or non-Western states are
prepared to rely on non-Western legal advisors.
While appearances before the ICJ do not suggest any strong trends
in the use of non-national lawyers in international law, there is one
leading indicator that may suggest some greater diffusion in the practice
of international law in the future. Each year the American Society for
International Law sponsors an international moot court competition for
108. I.C.J., supra 35.
109. These two periods cross a gap in the 1970's when there was very little use of the
Court in general, and in the few cases the Court did hear, the non-Western states (India and
Pakistan) used all national lawyers.
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international law students. Between 1960 and 1980 the Jessup competition went from being a purely American contest to having a genuine
international component. " ° Between 1970 and 1980 the number of foreign teams participating increased from six to twenty-eight. Still,
American teams won every year between 1960 and 1980 except for
1976, when a team from the University of Toronto took the top spot.
Between 1981 and 1998, however, American teams have only won four
times. The expansion of international legal expertise is suggested in the
results of the past eighteen years, as presented in Table Nine. While still
largely dominated by the OECD states, teams from countries outside the
OECD have managed to defeat American and European teams at the
competition in recent years. A Singaporean team was victorious twice in
the 1980s. In the past five years non-OECD teams have had three victories compared to only two for the OECD. Furthermore, the two
victorious OECD teams were from Australia and Mexico rather than
from Western Europe or the United States.
The trends in the Jessup Moot Court Competition are probably the
strongest indicator that international legal expertise is beginning to diffuse. That more countries are producing international lawyers, and that
these new lawyers are succeeding in an important international legal
competition would seem to offer some basis for the expectation that international law may become more genuinely international in the future.
In the meantime, however, these talented new international lawyers and
the professors who have taught them remain on the sidelines at the ICJ.
TABLE NINE
JESSUP INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION WINNERS:

1981-1998
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Winner
Australia Nat'l U.
Nat'l USingapore
U.Kansas
Dalhousie (CAN)
Nat'l U.Singapore
Boston College
Georgetown
u. Melbourne

OECD

Number of
Countries Entered

Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y

29
23
25
28
36
26
39
43

110. Information about the Jessup competition and its history is available at:
http://www.ilsa.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2000).
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TABLE NINE (CONTINUED)

Winner

Year

OECD

Number of
Countries Entered

1989

U.British Columbia

Y

41

1990
1991

U.Georgia (US)
U.Saskatchewan

Y
Y

42
31

1992
1993

U.Paris
U.Melbourne

Y
Y

22
36

1994

U.Singapore

N

33

1995

U. Philippines

N

40

1996

U.Sydney

Y

44

1997

U.Catolica Andres Bella Venezuela

N

38

1998

U. Nacional Autonoma de Mexico

Y

48

CONCLUSIONS

The Spanish neo-scholastic Francisco de Vitoria tried to articulate a
vision of international law that could apply to South American Indians
as well as the Spanish. He argued for the use of natural law instead of
community norms as the foundation for international law. But, as has
happened so often throughout history, he made the mistake of assuming
that what were in fact the norms of a particular community were universal manifestations of natural law. He therefore concluded that the
Indians were violating law, rather than concluding that European notions of natural law required reexamination. "' The evidence we present
here suggests that contemporary theorists of international relations and
international law are in danger of making a similar error.
For the past three centuries international legal scholars and practitioners have been asserting the universal character of international law.
Since 1945, scholars and advocates have been making increasingly bold
claims about the effectiveness of international law and its potential to
regulate state action based on its universal character. In this same period, however, there has been relatively little effort to measure or even
to describe the effective internationalization of international legal practice. We have argued that the clear Western bias in legal practice before
the ICJ is one such measure. At a minimum, we have presented a clearer
description and fuller accounting of the Western bias in ICJ practice
I 11.

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR:

MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY

75-78 (1981).

A
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than has been heretofore available. Of course, we have tried to go much
further than this to argue that by this measure there are significant limitations in the diffusion and internalization of international legal norms.
This is not necessarily a claim that international law is unimportant in
the international system. As Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein explain,
"norms may not be widely held by actors but may nevertheless be collective features of the system-either by being institutionalized (in
procedures, formal rules, or law) or by being prominent in public discourse of a system.""' According to our analysis, this may be an apt
description of the present status of international legal norms.
That international law has emerged from the Western legal tradition
is well known. What is novel in our presentation is the empirical demonstration of the degree to which the practice of international law
remains connected to the Western states and the argument that this continuing Western bias tells us something significant about the nature of
international law. The mores and principles of international law have
not yet diffused to other cultures with sufficient robustness for them to
train and use their own legal expertise.
There is nothing wrong with the Western foundation for international law per se. It is not our purpose to argue that international law
needs to be some kind of cultural amalgam. International law could be
the simple extension of some particular national legal tradition to a
worldwide scale. Our argument is that the weak diffusion of legal practice is an effective indicator of the limited international character of
international legal principles.
Given its Western foundations, it may not be surprising that lawyers
who reside in the West continue to dominate international legal practice.
But the weak diffusion of international legal practice ultimately
suggests limitations in the diffusion of international legal norms, and a
constraint on the effectiveness of international law. Recognition of this
situation is particularly important for those who most earnestly call for
an expansion of legalism in the relations of states.
The title of this article is in the form of a question. It is meant to be
a provocative one. We have argued that the answer to this question one
gets from looking at the practice of international law at the ICJ is that
international law is still not very international. Because the ICJ is a particularly important and visible international legal institution, whom
states choose to represent them before the ICJ is a potent indicator not
merely of where international legal expertise currently resides, but also
of where international legal norms have been most strongly internalized.
112. Ronald L. Jepperson, et.al., Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security, in
THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 54 n. 69 (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. 1996).
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From the evidence of ICJ practice we have imputed the possibility that
non-OECD states put a relatively low priority on international law in
their foreign policy-making practices. This imputation will be controversial, not simply for its logical basis, but also because it is not often
that the argument is made that the world needs more lawyers. But in
international relations, the alternative to lawyers is often soldiers-a
national resource for which Western and non-Western states have demonstrated a similar enthusiasm."'
Hopefully, our argument will open a debate and provoke others to
look more directly at the role of law in foreign policy-making practices
and to propose alternative measures of the international character of
international law. We look forward to a more thorough consideration of
this important issue. In the meantime we reiterate the importance of
caution given the long-recognized danger that international law will be
misperceived as more international than it really is. Writing in 1795,
Robert Ward criticized the notion of international law as a universal
normative construct:
Rejecting therefore the laws of Nature and Reason (as the sole
foundation of the law of Nations) because we do not conceive
them powerful or fixed enough to bear the fabric that is erected
upon them; we conclude that what is commonly called the law
of nations, is not the law of all nations, but only such sets or
classes of them as are united together by similar religions, and
systems of morality."'
Two hundred years later, the evidence we have adduced suggests
that the practice of international law remains the province of a handful
of Western states. For the large majority of states in the international
system, international legal expertise appears to be something they have
to purchase abroad, rather than an indigenous capability that can serve
as a regular part of their own foreign policy-making processes. Until
more states develop sufficient in-house expertise, it will be difficult for
international law to serve as a robust and universal constraint on international behavior.

113. As of 1994, the non-OECD states that have appeared before the ICJ spent an average of 3.5% of their GDP on military spending, compared to 2.6% for the OECD states. See
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, YEARBOOK OF WORLD ARMA-

359-78 (1996).
114. Quoted in Forsyth, supra note 5, at 35.

MENTS AND DISARMAMENT

How Internationalis InternationalLaw?

Winter 2001 ]

APPENDIX

PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONAL REPRESENTATION

ON

Case
Corfu
Corfu
Asylum
Asylum
Anglo-Iranian Oil
Fisheries
Fisheries
Haya de la Torre
Haya de la Torre
Haya de la Torre
Anglo-Iranian Oil
Morocco
Morocco
Ambatielos
Ambatielos
Minguiers-Ecrohos
Minguiers-Ecrohos
Monetary Gold
Monetary Gold
Monetary Gold
Nottebohm
Nottebohm
Norweigian Loans
Norweigian Loans
Infants
Infants
Interhandel
Interhandel
Aerial Incident
Aerial Incident
Frontier Land
Frontier Land
Arbitral Award
Arbitral Award

ICJ LEGAL TEAMS

Legal Team

Year

% NonNational

OECD

Albania
UK
Colombia
Peru
UK
Norway
UK
Colombia
Cuba
Peru
Iran
France
US
Greece
UK
France
UK
France
Italy
UK
Guatemala
Liechtenstein
France
Norway
Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
US
Bulgaria
Israel
Belgium
Netherlands
Honduras
Nicaragua

1948
1948
1950
1950
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1951
1952
1952
1952
1953
1953
1953
1953
1954
1954
1954
1954
1954
1957
1957
1958
1958
1958
1958
1959
1959
1959
1959
1960
1960

71
0
0
16
0
50
0
0
0
16
22
0
0
61
0
0
0
0
0
0
32
74
0
0
0
35
0
0
48
0
0
0
42
56

0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
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PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONAL REPRESENTATION
ON

ICJ

Case
Indian Territory
Indian Territory
Preah Vihear
Preah Vihear
Cameroons
Cameroons
Barcelona Traction
Barcelona Traction
Southwest Africa
Southwest Africa
Southwest Africa
North Sea Shelf
North Sea Shelf
North Sea Shelf
Jurisdiction of the ICAO
Jurisdiction of the ICAO
Fisheries Jurisdiction
Fisheries Jurisdiction
Pakistani POWs
French Nuclear Testing
French Nuclear Testing
Aegean Sea
Diplomatic and Consular
Cont Shelf: Libya-Tunisia
Cont Shelf: Libya-Tunisia
Cont Shelf: Libya-Malta
Cont Shelf: Libya-Malta
Cont Shelf: Libya-Malta
Gulf of Maine
Gulf of Maine
Military and Paramilitary

LEGAL TEAMS (CONTINUED)

Legal Team

Year

% NonNational

OECD

India
Portugal
Cambodia
Thailand
Cameroon
UK
Belgium
Spain
Ethiopia
Liberia
South Africa
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
India
Pakistan
Germany
UK
Pakistan
Australia
New Zealand
Greece
US
Libya
Tunisia
Italy
Libya
Malta
Canada
US
Nicaragua

1960
1960
1962
1962
1963
1963
1964
1964
1965
1965
1965
1968
1968
1968
1972
1972
1973
1973
1973
1974
1974
1976
1980
1982
1982
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984
1984

56
33
67
53
14
0
53
42
77
52
0
33
29
25
0
0
0
0
0
12
0
40
0
69
42
11
75
75
35
0
71

0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0

US

1984

0

1

Libya

1985

78

0

Activities

Military and Paramilitary
Activities

Revision of Continental
Shelf
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PERCENTAGE OF NON-NATIONAL REPRESENTATION
ON

ICJ LEGAL

Case
Revision of Continental
Shelf
Frontier Dispute
Frontier Dispute
Elettronica Sicula
Elettronica Sicula
Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier
Land, Island and Maritime
Frontier
Land, Island and Maritime

TEAMS (CONTINUED)

Legal Team

Year

% NonNational

OECD

Tunisia

1985

40

0

Burkina Faso
Mali
Italy
US
El Salvador

1986
1986
1989
1989
1990

63
36
28
40
36

0
0
1
1
0

Honduras

1990

50

0

Nicaragua

1990

43

0

Guinea-Bissau

1991

67

0

Senegal

1991

38

0

Australia
Nauru
Denmark
Norway
Chad
Libya
Bahrain
Qatar
Australia
Portugal
Libya
UK
Libya
US
Paraguay
US
Canada
Spain
Cameroon

1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1995
1995
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998

33
50
17
38
79
79
89
71
40
38
55
0
55
13
50
0
10
25
25

1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0

62

0

Frontier

Arbitral Award of 31 July
1989
Arbitral Award of 31 July
1989
Certain Phosphate Lands
Certain Phosphate Lands
Maritime Delimitation
Maritime Delimitation
Territorial Dispute
Territorial Dispute
Territorial Questions
Territorial Questions
East Timor
East Timor
Lockerbie: Libya-U.K.
Lockerbie: Libya-U.K.
Lockerbie: Libya-U.S.
Lockerbie: Libya-U.S.
Consular Relations
Consular Relations
Fisheries Jurisdiction
Fisheries Jurisdiction
Land and Maritime
Boundary

Land and Maritime
Boundary

I

Nigeria

I

1998
I
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Mean Percent
non-national

Median Percent
Non-National

OECD

.15

0

Non-OECD

.44

.50
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